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UK PSTI Act compliance guide for connected hardware

15 November 2026

Since 29 April 2024, anyone placing consumer connectable products on the UK market has had to meet three baseline security requirements under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) regime. The rules cover passwords, vulnerability reporting and the publication of minimum security update periods. They are short to state and less short to implement, because each one reaches into product design, firmware release planning and customer-facing documentation at the same time.

What the PSTI regime requires of manufacturers

The security requirements for relevant connectable products are threefold, according to GOV.UK guidance on the regulations. Universal default passwords and easily guessable passwords are banned. Manufacturers must publish information on how to report security issues. And they must publish information on minimum security update periods. The detail sits in the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023, which operate under the PSTI Act 2022.

The password rule is the one hardware teams tend to grasp first, and it is the one that most directly shapes production. Under the Regulations, passwords must be either unique per product or defined by the user. A shared factory credential printed in a manual and burned into every unit off the line is the pattern the rule is aimed at. A password generated per device during manufacture, or a setup flow that forces the customer to choose one before the product goes online, both fit the wording. The practical point is that this has to be settled before units ship, because a fix after the fact means a firmware change and a customer who has to act on it.

The vulnerability reporting requirement is about visibility. Manufacturers must publish at least one contact point for reporting security issues, and they must state when acknowledgments and status updates will be provided. That second element is easy to overlook. A bare email address does not meet the standard; the published information also has to tell a researcher or customer when to expect a reply and when to expect progress news. A team that publishes a mailbox nobody monitors, or promises timescales it cannot meet, has created a compliance problem of its own making.

The third requirement concerns support periods. Manufacturers must publish the defined support period for security updates. If that period is extended, the new period has to be published as soon as practicable. This puts a commercial decision in the open: a company has to commit, in public, to how long it will keep patching a given product. Product managers should settle that figure early, with engineering and finance in the room, because it determines the long-term cost of maintaining firmware branches and build infrastructure.

Alongside these duties sits the statement of compliance, which Schedule 4 of the Regulations describes in detail. It is the document through which a manufacturer declares that the product meets the requirements. Its contents are set out in the final section below.

Which products are in scope and which are excluded

The regulations apply to relevant consumer products that can connect to the internet or a network. The test is therefore twofold: the product is aimed at consumers, and it has some connectivity. A smart speaker, a connected doorbell, a Wi-Fi-enabled appliance or a network-attached camera all fit that description in ordinary terms. Hardware with no network capability sits outside, and so does equipment not offered to consumers.

The notable exclusions concern common computing devices. The regulations do not cover desktop computers, laptop computers and tablet computers that do not have the capability to connect to cellular networks. There is a carve-back: if one of those devices is designed exclusively for children under 14 years, it falls within the regime after all. A tablet marketed solely to young children is therefore treated differently from a general-purpose tablet, even where the hardware is otherwise similar.

Two practical consequences follow. First, the cellular condition matters. A tablet that can connect to cellular networks is not within that exclusion, so a manufacturer cannot assume that the word "tablet" in a product description settles the question. Second, scope decisions should be documented. If a company concludes that a product is excluded, the reasoning, including the product's connectivity features and intended audience, should be written down and kept with the product file, so that it can be produced if anyone asks.

Mixed product ranges deserve a specific check. A company selling a laptop alongside a connected accessory, or a tablet in both Wi-Fi-only and cellular variants, may find that the answer differs across the range. Treating the range as a single category invites mistakes in both directions: either spending effort on products that are exempt, or missing products that are not. Going through the catalogue line by line, recording connectivity and intended user for each, is a sensible first exercise.

How enforcement works in the UK

The regime became enforceable from 29 April 2024. The Office for Product Safety and Standards (OPSS) is responsible for enforcing the PSTI Act 2022 and the 2023 Regulations, as the GOV.UK page on the product security regime sets out. Having a single named enforcer is useful for compliance planning, since it tells manufacturers where to look for guidance and who may ask for evidence.

For planning purposes, the enforcement date is the line that matters. Products supplied to UK consumers from that date need to meet the requirements, which means design decisions on credentials and update policy had to be made well before launch rather than at the point of sale. Companies with long-lived stock or products in a long development cycle should check their pipeline against the date and not assume that older designs will be given latitude.

An enforcer with a defined remit generally works from documents as much as from hardware, so the paper trail matters. The published reporting contact, the published support period and the statement of compliance are all things an authority can read without opening a product. A tidy, current set of these documents is the cheapest form of protection a manufacturer has. The reverse is also true: a product that meets the password rule but has no published support period still falls short of the regime.

Readers who sell into several markets should avoid assuming that compliance elsewhere carries over automatically. The UK has its own Act, its own Regulations and its own enforcer. Work done for another jurisdiction may help, but the UK publication requirements and the Schedule 4 statement still need to be addressed on their own terms.

How ETSI EN 303 645 supports compliance

GOV.UK identifies ETSI EN 303 645 as the leading global standard for cyber security for consumer IoT, and the PSTI security requirements align with key provisions of it. That alignment gives manufacturers a route to follow. Companies that already build to the standard, or test against it, will find that much of the PSTI baseline is familiar territory, particularly on passwords, vulnerability disclosure and update support.

Precision is needed about what this does and does not mean. The PSTI requirements align with key provisions of the standard; they do not simply restate all of it. The legal obligations come from the Act and the Regulations, so a product assessed against the standard still needs to be checked against the three PSTI requirements and the statement of compliance rules specifically. The standard is a strong reference point and a sound engineering framework, but the legal text is what the enforcer applies.

In practice, a manufacturer can use the standard as a structure for internal work. Engineering teams can map each PSTI duty to the corresponding provision, assign an owner, and record the evidence: a test result for the password behaviour, a screenshot of the published reporting page, a release policy that fixes the support period. That mapping doubles as supporting material for the declaration of compliance. It also gives the business a defensible basis for saying it took the regime seriously, which matters if a question ever arises.

There is a commercial angle too. Retailers and business customers buying connected products increasingly want to see that suppliers have a recognised security baseline. Being able to point to alignment with an internationally recognised standard, alongside UK-specific compliance, makes those conversations simpler and avoids a bespoke questionnaire for each buyer.

What belongs in the statement of compliance

Schedule 4 of the Regulations sets out what a statement of compliance must contain. Each element is simple, but the statement is only as reliable as the processes behind it, so the checklist below is best used as a final review before a product is released:

  • Product type or batch, so the statement is tied to identifiable goods.
  • Manufacturer name and address.
  • A declaration of compliance with the security requirements.
  • The defined support period for security updates.
  • The place and date of issue.

Two items deserve extra care. The defined support period in the statement must agree with the one published for customers; if the two differ, one of them is wrong, and an extension announced later has to be published as soon as practicable. And the product type or batch reference should be precise enough that someone holding a unit can tell whether the statement covers it. A vague description such as "our smart range" does not do that job.

A final practical step is version control. When firmware, hardware revisions or support commitments change, the statement may need to be reissued with a new date. Keeping one owner responsible for the document, and a short review against this list at each release, is a modest habit that keeps the paperwork in line with the product on the shelf.

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